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Means, rights, and opportunities - on Arthur Ripstein’s Private Wrongs  
Emmanuel Voyiakis# 
 
Arthur Ripstein is not the only theorist who thinks that tort law is the law of private 
wrongs, but the case he makes for this view is one of the most direct to have 
appeared in the literature, and all the stronger for that reason. So far, those who see 
torts as wrongs have tended to claim that tort law instantiates a special kind of 
justice, which aims to ‘correct’ wrongs, or that it provides people with the power of 
‘civil recourse’ against such wrongs. Those claims are very plausible, but if correction 
and/or civil recourse are due only when one has suffered a wrong, we need an 
account of what constitutes a wrong. And if a wrong, as most of those theorists have 
tended to accept, is the infringement of a right, we need an account of people’s 
rights. Without such an account, all we have is a description of a cart, and we are 
waiting for the horse that moves it. The problem is not just that the cart cannot 
move itself. It also takes a particular kind of horse to run it. For a start, the claim that 
tort law does ‘corrective justice’ has only as much strength as the substantive case 
for thinking that this form of justice is worth attending to –in a way that, say, 
‘vigilante justice’ is not. The same goes for the bipolar structure of a tort action and 
the omnipresence of ideas of duty, wrongs and wrong-doing in tort law. Theories of 
tort law should certainly aim to account for those standard features of the law, but 
that does not show either why any or all of those features are significant, or how 
much significance we should accord them. More importantly, both the idea of 
corrective justice and the relevant features of tort actions and tort law could be 
explained by appeal to views of reasons that those who see torts as wrongs have 
tended to distance themselves from. For example, maybe tort law is the law of 
private wrongs because looking at it like that helps reduce the social cost of 
accidents. On that hypothesis, the significance of wrong-doing would be contingent 
on whether thinking about tort law in those terms would help achieve that 
consequentialist aim. The cart of corrective justice may turn out to be dead weight.     
Private Wrongs puts the horse before the cart. It argues that tort law is the law of 
private wrongs, not because it instantiates a form of corrective justice or civil 
recourse, but because people have two general rights, neither of which is 
extinguished when violated: the right to set and pursue their own aims in conditions 
of mutual independence, and the right that the means they have to pursue those 
aims, mainly their body and their property, not be subjected to another person’s 
choice. With these simple thoughts in hand, Ripstein is able to do a lot of work. He is 
able to account for the relationship between those rights and the remedies that tort 
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law provides when these rights are violated. He is able to explain why tort law, tort 
actions and tort remedies have their familiar bipolar structure, and the extent and 
limits of the protection they offer. And he is able to do all this in non-
consequentialist terms. This last aspect matters because it shows that, although 
Private Wrongs does not set out to defeat economic accounts of tort law, it can hold 
its own against them. Ask other fans of the idea that torts are wrongs why we should 
not endorse economic accounts of tort law, and they will say that economic accounts 
are not consistent with corrective justice, and/or that they do not take certain typical 
features of tort law and tort actions seriously. Ask Ripstein, and he will say that those 
accounts are not compatible with our right to mutual independence. It is not hard to 
see that the simpler among those claims is also the more powerful. My aim in this 
note is to draw attention to certain distinctive payoffs of that claim, but also to 
suggest that, in putting the case for the view of torts as private wrongs in such clear 
and forceful terms, Private Wrongs has also exposed some of that view’s normative 
and explanatory limitations.   
Ripstein argues that tort law determines whether you may require a defendant to 
bear the burden of repair for some harm or injury (the difference is not germane to 
my present purposes) to your means on the basis of the following test. Were you 
able to set your own ends and were you free to use your means to pursue your ends 
in the situation in which the harm occurred? If the answer is yes, then the defendant 
is not liable to make repair for the harm you have suffered. If the answer is no, but 
the defendant neither set your ends nor used or destroyed your means, they are not 
liable to make repair either. The defendant incurs such liability only when and insofar 
as they assumed charge of your ends or means without your authorisation.  
This invites us to ask what it takes for a defendant to assume charge over your ends 
or means (for simplicity, I will henceforth refer to means only). We can easily think of 
examples. If someone steals your camera, they put themselves in charge of your 
means and, for Ripstein, that is why they are liable to you for conversion. By 
contrast, if they move into the frame just as you are taking a picture in the park, and 
thus spoil your shot, they are not assuming charge of your means, and owe you no 
compensation for the inconvenience. What makes photobombing different from 
stealing your camera, Ripstein says, is that 
many other things that make up the context in which you use your means are 
not among the means you have. Changes to the context in which you use your 
means may make your means useless (at least temporarily) for the specific 
end you seek, but leave the means intact, in the sense that they remain 
subject to your choice.1 
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The park and its other users are not amongst your means. Other people’s actions are, 
as far as your own activities are concerned, only part of the context in which you use 
your camera. The photobomber may ruin your shot, perhaps at great cost to you, but 
their action does not make it any less the case that you are in charge of the means 
you had to take that shot, namely your body and your camera. This suggests that the 
test Ripstein has in mind is both negative and relational in character, i.e. that what 
matters for the purposes of tort liability is not whether your means remain subject to 
your choice (after all, they may be destroyed by natural causes), but whether they 
have become subject to another person’s choice.  
Ripstein describes your core moral right that others not subject your means to their 
choices with the phrase ‘no person is in charge of another person’s means’.2 The 
shorthand is appealing, but the translation it involves is not perfect, largely because 
the notion of being ‘in charge’ is a little too categorical for Ripstein’s purposes. On a 
plausible understanding of what it means to be ‘in charge’, you either are in charge, 
or you are not, and being in charge of something entitles you to call all the shots in 
relation to that thing. As Ripstein develops his account, it becomes clear that he 
understands the phrase in a more relaxed manner. For example, when he turns to 
negligence, he says that another person’s taking charge of your means need not 
involve them taking anything like full control of your means, or depriving you of such 
control. In some cases, it is enough that the other person has undermined the 
‘security’ of your means, an idea that Ripstein then explains in terms of whether they 
have subjected your means to their choice.3 I drop a banana peel on the pavement. 
You could avoid stepping on it by exercising just a little more caution than a person 
who walks with their chest high, as you do, naturally would. My negligence does not 
take control of your body, but it does increase the risk to your physical health in a 
way you could object to. We might say that, while you are in charge in the sense that 
you are still the master of your stroll (after all, you are still able to look around you 
and to stop, go, or swerve at any moment), I am in charge in the sense that I have 
made your means less secure by subjecting them to the risk caused by my choice to 
drop the banana peel on the pavement. Ripstein believes, very plausibly, that this 
more attenuated sense is enough to make me a wrongdoer, and he never leaves the 
reader in doubt as to the precise case for that claim. However, the fact that sense in 
question is attenuated suggests that Ripstein’s shorthand of choice is not always a 
natural expression of his account of wrongdoing.4  
                                                          
2 At 35. 
3 At 79-80. But Ripstein does not regard exposure to risk of harm to your means as harm in itself. 
4 In other passages, Ripstein calls another person’s being in charge of your means ‘interfering’ with 
those means, but since he takes both ‘subjecting’ and ‘interfering with’ to be different from 
‘changing the context’ in which your means are used, I take the first two terms to be synonymous. 
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Quibbles about phrasing aside, Ripstein is clearly right to assign a central justificatory 
role to the idea that you can reasonably want to be in charge of your means, and 
that you have a legitimate complaint against anyone who subjects those means to 
their choice. His explanation of why tort law distinguishes between the thief of your 
camera, the banana peel-dropper and the photobomber is intuitively compelling. It 
also affords us simple and natural solutions to some puzzles that have tended to 
cause trouble for existing wrong-based accounts of tort law. I note two that seemed 
to me particularly instructive.  
One is Vincent v Lake Erie, where the defendant was held liable for having caused 
damage to the claimant’s dock, even though the defendant’s decision to enter the 
dock in order to escape a storm that threatened to sink his ship was held to have 
been wholly reasonable. If the defendant did not commit a wrong on entering the 
claimant’s property, how can we explain his being held liable in repair? Ripstein is 
not the first to argue that the real basis of the court’s decision was trespass rather 
than negligence. The distinctive character of his argument lies in his explanation of 
why the defendant could be liable to make repair without having committed trespass 
on entering the claimant’s dock. The defendant did not commit trespass, Ripstein 
argues, because one’s ownership of one’s means can sometimes entitle one to enter 
another person’s property to retrieve chattels that have accidentally found 
themselves there or to protect one’s chattels from destruction, that person’s general 
right to exclude others from their property notwithstanding. And the reason why, in 
entering another person’s property momentarily for that purpose, one is not 
subjecting the other person’s means to one’s choice is that this privilege flows from 
the nature of the parties’ respective property rights. If entry in these circumstances 
counted as subjecting the other person’s property to one’s choice, then so would the 
other person’s refusing to allow one to retrieve one’s chattel from that person’s 
property. By the same token, one’s entitlement is exhausted in entering to recover 
the chattel or to keep it safe. Any damage that one causes in that process is damage 
caused in trespass, and is recoverable on that basis. Ripstein is therefore able to 
explain why the claimant succeeded in Vincent through an account of the parties’ 
respective right to be in charge of their own means. 
The merits of that account lie in even plainer view in Ripstein’s treatment of 
contributory negligence (comparative negligence, in US terms). If tort law is about 
correcting wrongs, explaining why claimants may sometimes be required to bear part 
of the burden of repair becomes puzzling. When I fail to spot the banana peel you 
have dropped on the pavement, even though I would have done so easily had I been 
watching my step just a little, I have done something foolish, but I have not wronged 
anyone. How can my carelessness be taken as a basis for reducing my entitlement to 
damages for your own negligence in dropping the peel? Ripstein argues that the 
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puzzle is resolved if we focus on our respective entitlements to constrain each other 
before the accident. My entitlement to keep my means secure allows me to require 
you not to create unusual risks to my health by dropping the banana peel on the 
pavement. But that entitlement does not also allow me to require you to protect me 
against my failure to watch my step. Such an entitlement would subject your means 
to my decisions about how to protect myself against usual everyday dangers in 
respect of which you owe me no duty of care.  
These merits notwithstanding, I want to suggest that the role of choice and 
ownership of means in the justification of tort principles is more complex than 
Ripstein’s account makes out, and that this leads his account to certain conclusions 
that look much too strong, both as a matter of morality and as a matter of tort law. I 
propose to make the point in moral terms, and extend it to tort law, relying, 
unsurprisingly, on tort doctrines and principles that Ripstein opts to say little about. I 
begin from the assumption that the sort of situations to put Ripstein’s account to the 
test are those in which (i) a person subjects your means to their choice, but they 
have a legitimate complaint against being saddled with the burden of repair for that 
wrong, which would therefore need to be borne by other persons, including perhaps 
yourself; and, conversely, (ii) you are entitled to require another person to bear the 
burden of repair even though they have not subjected your means to their choice. 
Consider a situation of the first sort. Suppose that I am employed as an assembly line 
worker in your factory. I am a good worker, and you pay me a good wage. In the 
years I have been with you, I have been careful and diligent, and the system of work 
in your factory is fully compliant with the relevant health and safety regulations. One 
day I lose my concentration, press the wrong button, and injure a fellow worker. In 
doing that, I have subjected my fellow worker’s means to my choices, and therefore 
have wronged them. Leave aside for the moment what tort law tends to say in these 
situations, and consider whether I might have a legitimate moral complaint against 
having to bear the burden of repair for the wrong I have committed. 
On a surface reading of Ripstein’s account, it is hard to see how that could be so. 
What is true of me, namely that I subjected my fellow worker’s means to my choices, 
is not true of anyone else in the situation. There is no action or omission by you, as 
our common employer, or others that either me or the victim could have pointed to 
in advance of the accident and said ‘don’t do this, you are undermining the security 
of our means!’ (e.g. neither of us could have required you to put more safety systems 
in place). Your status as our common employer simply sets the context in which we, 
as your employees, get to use our respective means. It follows that, were I to ask 
you, as our employer, to bear the burden of repair for my having subjected my fellow 
worker’s means to my choice, I would be putting myself in charge of your means too. 
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Consider now a different way of looking at the situation. Working for you requires 
me to exercise skill and advertence for long periods of time. The industrial nature of 
the work entails that even a moment’s carelessness on my part can sometimes cause 
great harms. Errare humanum est, so we can estimate that even the most diligent 
worker will have such moments in the course of their career. Finally, the structure of 
market economies entails, first, that workers need employment to secure their basic 
well-being and, second, that they do not generally have the means to repair the 
wrongs they commit in the industrial context, as taking out insurance for that 
purpose can be a very costly option. You want me to exercise my skills under those 
conditions, and I complain that agreeing to work for you would be a terrible deal for 
me if it leaves me to bear the burden of repair in case I make mistakes while 
exercising those skills. Note the focused character of this complaint. I am not asking 
for a socialist revolution that would challenge your ownership of the means of 
production (though I am game). I am not doubting the reasonableness of the 
standards of care and skill that I am required to observe, or protesting against the 
potential impact of my mistakes on my job security. I am only complaining about 
having to bear the burden of repair for my workplace negligence.          
Does my complaint carry any moral force? The fact that not being protected against 
the burden of repair for my negligence would leave me in a tight spot is not enough 
to justify why I may require you, as my employer, or anyone else to provide me with 
such protection. It is, however, a start. You know everything about my structural 
position, and the means, opportunities and risks that come with it. In particular, you 
know that I need to take up dependent labour in order to secure my basic well-being, 
and that getting me to work for you would expose me to the risk of making mistakes 
and cause harms liability for which I cannot possibly bear alone. The structure that 
puts me in that position also gives you access to insurance and market mechanisms 
that allow you to pass on and spread the cost of repair to the community of 
consumers of the goods or services that your business produces (this makes you, 
effectively, a middle-person in the distribution of that cost). Moreover, you have 
reason to want that structure to have the shape that it does, with you and me 
occupying our respective positions in it, because that is central to the pursuit of your 
own entrepreneurial ends. You want there to be people willing to work in your 
enterprise, and under your terms. The moral force of my complaint is a function of 
the fact that, were you not to protect me against the burden of repair, you would fail 
to make acceptable to me the social structure that you want me to accept.5  
                                                          
5 You would, of course, prefer a structure that did not require you to function as a middle-person for 
the distribution of the cost of repair, but, as I and my fellow workers can tell you, you can’t get 
everything you want in life. 
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If this story adds up, workplace negligence is an example of a situation in which the 
burden of repair ought not to fall on the person who subjects other people’s means 
to their choice -the negligent employee- and it ought to fall on a person who has 
done so such thing -the employer. I have framed the argument in moral terms, but it 
is reasonably clear that tort law tends to reach a similar result in holding employers 
vicariously liable for the torts of their employees. To be sure, there are differences. 
Most notably, tort law tends to allow employers and their insurers to claim back an 
indemnity from their employees. However, that right has been abolished in some 
jurisdictions, and is hardly ever exercised in those that have not. Save for some 
intentional torts, employees do not have to bear the burden of repair for their 
workplace negligence, and perhaps the moral force of the argument I have outlined 
explains why. It follows that this example raises a genuine challenge to Ripstein’s 
guiding idea.6  
Private Wrongs puts vicarious liability to one side, though it acknowledges that the 
doctrine raises questions that need to be addressed. I hope to have shown that 
honouring this IOU is important for the success of Ripstein’s account.7 At the same 
time, it seems to me that the ‘spirit’ of the justification of vicarious liability that I 
have outlined is not radically different to Ripstein’s own. It too accords fundamental 
significance to the parties’ ability to set ends for themselves and use their means to 
pursue those ends. It agrees that the negligent employee is a wrongdoer and 
explains this on the basis of the distinction between subjecting another person’s 
means to one’s choice and merely changing the context of their use. And, like 
Ripstein’s account, it tries to justify the imposition of vicarious liability on employers 
in a ‘systematic’ way, by treating the respective rights and duties of the parties as 
aspects of an interdependent scheme of mutual entitlements. What it denies is the 
further claim that the parties’ entitlements at the stage of repair are fixed by the 
parties’ original entitlements over their respective means. That claim may be true in 
many instances of tort liability, but it is not true in all of them. 
A similar conclusion seems to follow a fortiori in situations where you are entitled to 
require a person to bear the burden of repair, even though they have not subjected 
your means to their choice. The typical example of that situation would be products 
liability. Most tort systems say that a producer is liable for harms caused by defective 
products, and tend to define ‘defective’ by reference to consumer expectations of 
safety, attributing only limited significance to producers’ right to use their means for 
                                                          
6 The puzzle is not resolved by saying that the employee’s conduct can be attributed to the 
employer’s agency too, as the justification for such attribution would itself need to be defended on 
the basis of one’s general account of tort liability.  
7 If you think that Ripstein might be unable to explain vicarious liability (and, as I will say below, strict 
products liability), but that his account still succeeds ‘as far as it goes’ or as an account of some parts 
of tort law, maybe I can also interest you in my account of two thirds of an elephant. 
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their own ends. The contrast with the position of non-producers is stark. If the cake I 
baked and served to my guests makes them ill, my tort liability will be negligence-
based. If I bought the cake from your company, your liability will be strict. The only 
thing that changes from the first situation to the second is the identity of the 
defendant. The risk posed by our respective activities to the security of the 
claimants’ health remains the same. On Ripstein’s account, it should follow that my 
guests may not restrict your company’s activities to a greater extent than they may 
restrict mine. But that is not the law in any modern tort system I am aware of.  
Private Wrongs does not discuss products liability, and perhaps Ripstein is not 
worried about its compatibility with his argument, but it would have been good to 
see the case for this. My impression is that, like vicarious liability, strict products 
liability raises a challenge not so much to the broad structure of Ripstein’s account as 
to his more particular claim that tort liability turns on whether a person is using their 
own means only, or subjecting other people’s means to their choice. Ripstein invites 
us to think that you owning your means as a business is just like me owning mine as a 
dinner host, and that therefore our respective activities ought to be constrained 
under similar terms. However, there is a clear aspect in which our positions do differ. 
That difference does not have to do with our rights over our respective means, but 
with the opportunities that come with owning the means that each of us does. The 
position of a business comes with certain opportunities that the position of a dinner 
host does not. Most notably, it comes with the opportunity to take advantage of a 
social structure that allows businesses to pass on and spread the cost of their 
activities to the community of consumers of the goods or services produced. This 
opportunity is not part of a business’s means in the way Ripstein understands the 
notion (in his contribution to the issue, Peter Vallentyne calls it ‘proprietarian’), but it 
seems to me to have moral significance for tort liability for reasons analogous to 
those I outlined in respect of the employer’s vicarious liability for workplace 
negligence. Perhaps your business cannot complain against being held strictly liable 
for harm caused by defective products because such liability makes acceptable to 
consumers a social structure that you, as a businessperson, have reason to want 
consumers to accept. Note, again, that accepting this does not commit us to the 
conclusion that tort law is there to do social or distributive justice. We could still see 
torts as wrongs and endorse most of the basic setup of Ripstein’s account. What we 
would need to drop is the claim that for you to be liable in tort, you must have 
subjected another person’s means to your choice. Producers of defective products 
do not subject the consumer’s means to their choice any more than non-producers 
do. The former incur liability for repair because and insofar as the particular sort of 
thing they own comes with some special opportunities for interaction with 
consumers. If that is correct, ownership of means (and its lack) matters less for tort 
liability than Private Wrongs would have you think.  
